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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GLADYS S. BULLOUGH, WINIFRED S.
McDONALD, GRACE S. MALQIDST, IRMA
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LOUIS K. SIMS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents and Cross Appellants
vs.
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and BEVERLY SIMS CANDLAND, Executors
of the Estate of MILTON K. SIMS, Deceased;
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L. SIMS. SIMS REALTY COMPANY, a
corporation, EVELYN B. MAZURAN,
MARJORIE S. SIMS, LILLIAN SIMS and
ROBERT E. SIMS,
Defendants-Appellants

Case No.
10,039

GLADYS S. BULLOUGH, WINIFRED S.
McDONALD, GRACE S. MALQUIST, IRMA
S. HANNIBAL, CLEVELAND K. SIMS and
LOUIS K. SIMS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents and Cross Appellants
vs.

GEORGE MILTON SIMS, ELMER L. SIMS and
BEVERLY SIMS CANDLAND, Executors of
the Estate of MIL TON K. SIMS, Deceased,
Defendants-Appellants

RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to determine whether plaintiffs are
partners in the Salt Lake Transfer Company, or are coowners, but not partners; to determine whether they have
made a valid contract to sell their interests to defendants
and, if they have made such a contract, to determine
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whether plaintiffs' interests were sold in 1932 for 1932
values or in 1960 for 1960 values; and, if partnership be
found, to obtain an order of partnership accounting and
winding up, or, if sale be found, to determine the sales
price as of the applicable date.
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
The trial of the case was divided into two phases, liability and damages. The court held that plaintiffs were
co-owners, but not partners, that they had made a contract (Ex. P-B) in 1932 which was not void for fraud,
mistake or undue influence, that the contract permitted
either party to terminate the co-ownership by notice to
the other, that neither did terminate that co-ownership
until 1960 when defendants tendered plaintiffs an insufficient amount for their share of the business and plaintiffs
refused the tender and brought this action. The court, in
the trial of the damages issues, found the value of plaintiffs' share of the company and undistributed profits,
including interest from the sale date to judgment, to be
$229,842.07, of which $48,000 has been paid by defendants,
leaving $181,842.07 still due.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a determination affirming the trial
court's Judgments, or, in the alternative, if the Findings
and Judgments are to be reversed, a reversal directing
the trial court to find that plaintiffs and defendants are
partners, that the partners are the equitable owners of
the real estate defendants transferred out of Salt Lake
Transfer Company into their own corporation, Sims
Realty Company, and that an accounting and winding up
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of the aftairs of said partnership be had.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with some of appellants' Statement
of Facts, disagree with some, and claim that additional
facts must be considered to permit a correct determination
of the appeal. Appellants' Statement of Facts is replete
with argument, all of which argument respondents controvert. For example, appellants state that the two
brothers, George and Milton carried on their business
from 1932 to 1959. The facts show and the trial court
found that the two brothers managed the business owned
by plaintiffs and defendants from 1932 to 1959 and after
Milt's death in 1959 it was carried on for all of the parties
hereto until June 30, 1960.
On page 6 of their brief appellants state that George
and Gladys did in fact execute a valuation of the assets
under the 1932 agreement and that Exs. D-H and D-I
were executed by Gladys (plaintiff) based on values
known to her. The trial court found to the contrary, that
there had never been a proper or binding valuation under
either Ex. P-A or P-B (R. 111, Finding No. 7). That this
finding is abundantly supported by the evidence is shown
hereafter in Point VII of the Argument.
Appellants state the Bill of Sale (Ex. P-A) to have been
executed at a time "when money was not readily available to pay for the interests of the brothers and sisters."
The record is wholly silent on the availability of money to
George and Milton in 1932 except for such information as
can be derived from Ex. D-I which showed that George
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and Milton each had an unencumbered interest of
$18,587.17 in a business whose only debt was $2,266.35 of
current accounts payable, and that they also had 1/9 of
their father's interest, worth not less than $3,614.00, making an aggregate ownership of not less than $44,402.34,
almost all in liquid assets. If the true value of the business
in 1932 was $95,000 as George indicates in Ex. D-C,
George and Milton were just that much ($5,623.54 for
their share) better off in terms of cash and borrowing
power. Under the trial court's decision for the plaintiffs,
and the evidence that George and Milton were worth
some $50,000 in the depths of the Depression, it could be
inferred that defendants did not want to buy in 1932,
rather than that they were unable to buy.
Appellant states that the 1932 agreement was a withdrawal by plaintiffs from the partnership. The court
found otherwise (R. 110, Finding No. 5).
At page 9, in discussing the meeting of the parties in
1959, appellants state that the parties agreed that $18,000
was "a fair price" for plaintiffs' interests. No testimony is
cited to that effect and none is in the record. Defendants
themselves objected to the admission in evidence of the
amount offered by George to his brothers and sisters on
the ground that it was irrelevant, and it was only permitted in the record at all after stipulation that it had no
probative effect as to value (R. 186). The record does
show that $18,000 each would have been acceptable to the
plaintiffs then present, but none had made any examination as to the true value of his interest.
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On page 10, appellants state that John Sims "agreed
upon a valuation of $10,000.00 for his 1f27th interest."
They cite R. 757 as proof, and neglect to state that, after
objection, they withdrew the question now cited as proof
(R. 758). The only evidence actually in the record regarding John Sims' settlement with the defendants is at R.
769, where John is cited by George as saying he was
hard up and needed money and would take $10,000.00
cash for his interest. This cannot be seriously urged as
probative of value. So far as the record shows John never
got closer to the company books than Las Vegas, where
the above settlement took place (R. 769).
ADDITIONAL FACTS
George A. Sims is the oldest of the nine brothers and
sisters who are the plaintiffs and principal defendants in
this action, Milton K. Sims, now deceased, is the next
younger, the six plaintiff brothers and sisters are next
younger and John Sims is the youngest. In 1932 John
Sims was a minor and all of the others had reached their
majority. Each of the plaintiffs testified that their family
was close knit and harmonious, full of love and affection,
that they loved and trusted George, that George, as the
eldest brother was the family leader (R. 164), the "guidepost" of the family (R. 135) , and that they relied upon
him in 1932 when Ex. P-B was executed, as well as before
and since that time. Each plaintiff testified to the same
effect: Mrs. McDonald (R. 135-6 and R. 142), Mrs. Hannibal (R. 162-4), Mr. Cleveland Sims (R. 194 and 196), Mr.
Louis Sims (R. 203 and 205), Mrs. Malquist (R. 214 and
216), and Mrs. Bullough (R. 222-3). The defendant,
George A. Sims, characterized his relationship to the
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plaintiffs as follows (R. 314-5) :
"Q Mr. Sims, I think the testimony here shows
that you are the eldest of the nine children?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you started to work in the business
some of the children were still very small, they were
babies, were they not?
A Well, I started when I was 21, in the fall of '21,
and the babies came along about every two years.
Q

You mean yours or your father's?

A No. I didn't get married at that time.

Q In other words, some of your younger brothers
and sisters are about 20 years young than yourself,
are they not?
A I would imagine that's about right.

Q Now, in 1904, I believe, your father went to
Europe on a mission?
A It was about that time.
Q And when he went on a mission he was gone
how long?

A About two years.
Q And you stepped in and took charge of the business at that time?

A Yes, sir.
Q And you were living home with all your brothers and sisters?

A Until I got married.
Q And the testimony here showed that they
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looked up to you as the elder brother and relied on
you and loved you, would you say that's correct?
A I'd say that was right.

Q And during all the balance of your life and
their lives, right up to the present time that has been
pretty much the case, you have been the older
brother looked up to?
A I would say they have, always.

Q And that was true in 1932 also, was it not, Mr.
Sims?
A Yes, sir."
The trial court found that, at the time Ex. P-B was
executed, the older George occupied a fiduciary position
with relation to the plaintiffs (R. 110, Finding No. 3).
At the time of his last illness George H. Sims, who was
the founder of the Salt Lake Transfer Company and the
father of the nine persons referred to above, owned 60%
of the Salt Lake Transfer Company and was entitled to
one-third of its profits. The remaining portion of the Salt
Lake Transfer Company was owned by the two eldest
sons, George and Milton, each of whom owned 207o and
each of whom was, under their partnership agreement
with their father, entitled to one-third of the profits.
Two days before his death, and at a time when he was
so ill he could not sign his name, indicating his signature
by a feeble "x," George H. Sims (the father) transferred
his interest in the Salt Lake Transfer Company to his
nine children in equal undivided shares (Ex. P-A).
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On April 4, 1932 George H. Sims (the father) passed
away. All of his children were in Salt Lake and the plaintiffs testified that they were grief stricken. The daughters
particularly testified as to their love for their father and
as to the depth and completeness of their mourning and
grief both at the time of his death and of his burial two
days later (R. 141, 165, 205, 216 and 224). One daughter
said the day of the funeral, April 6, 1932, "was about as
sad a day as you could imagine" (R. 216), and another
said she was in a state of shock and had to be helped
(R.165).
George and Milton were not so grieved as to distract
their minds from business. They had their attorney, Irwin
Clawson, draw for them the document which is Ex. P-B
and it was in George's hands, ready for presentation as
soon as their father was interred. According to the unanimous testimony of the six plaintiffs and without any
contradictory testimony from any other source, George
presented this document to his younger brothers and sisters almost immediately after they returned to the family
home from the cemetery on the day of the funeral (R.
140-143, 165-7, 194-6, 204-5, 215-17, and 225-6). Other
relatives and friends had come to the house and Gladys
Bullough, among others, was occupied trying to see that
they were fed and cared for. At this time George A. Sims
(defendant) said he wanted to talk with his brothers and
sisters, and called them into the front parlor, particularly
excluding their husbands and wives, closed the doors
dividing the parlor from the rest of the house and presented the 1932 agreement, Ex. P-B, for signature. He
stated, according to the unimpeached and uncontradicted
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testimony of the six plaintiffs, that the document had to
be signed so that he could be assured of the management
of the family business. His statements in this regard were
variously reported:
Winifred McDonald (R. 141) "He said we were to sign
it so that he and Milt would take charge of the business
for all of us with no interference." and (R. 143) "He was
just going to take care of the business for us."
Inna Hannibal (R. 166-7) "And George said, 'Well,
this is so that the business will go on just as it has been
going on. This is so that Milt and I can go on managing
the business.' "
Louis Sims (R. 205) "And then he had an agreement, I
think, to run the business and he asked us to sign it. And
I think the statement he made was so we wouldn't be
bothered about the running of the business, and so we all
signed it."
Grace Malquist (R. 218) "George told us that it was
very urgent and I imagine that's why he did it the same
day. He said it was very urgent. I don't know why, but he
said it was very urgent to form a new partnership immediately because of my father's death. He said, 'And I have
to have this signed to continue to operate the transfer
company.' And he said, 'I want this signed,' and he said,
'I don't want any interference from the management of it
with the other members of the family,' which is perfectly
reasonable."
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The defendant George Sims himself says of the occasion, in reply to a question by Mr. Pugsley as to whether
he made any declarations to his brothers and sisters, or
required them to sign the 1932 agreement (R. 309): "I
can't remember. It was something there, but I can't remember that."
There was no long perusal or any discussion of the
meaning of the agreement, nor any argument by the
grief-stricken younger brothers and sisters. Each of them
testified that he relied on George's honor, fairness, leadership and love and signed the document. One or two
thought they saw copies of the contract, others had never
read it.
Each of the plaintiffs testified that they never challenged the right of George to exercise the management of
Salt Lake Transfer Company without interference from
them, that they understood they had, as represented on
the day of their father's death, given the right to control
the operation of their company to their beloved elder
brothers, and that they had never sought to interfere in
the management since that date, although they had always considered themselves as owners and partners, having each received a patrimony of one-ninth from their
father. Each year they received an accounting of the
profits, showing them listed among the owners.
Copies of all partnership returns filed by the Salt Lake
Transfer Company from the time of the death of the
parent of the parties hereto until the year 1960 are in
evidence (Exs. P-J and P-K). In the Federal return for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the year 1932 (P-J) the defendant, George A. Sims, referred to himself as a "Trustee" for the one-third interest
owned by the nine children. In the appropriate portion of
the 1933 income tax returns, he referred to the nine
children as being "partners or members" calling all nine
(including himself and Milton) owners of "Misc. Minor
Interest." In 1934 he showed the plaintiffs as partners and
again referred to them as "Misc. Minor Interests." In 1935
he again indicated the participation of his brothers and
sisters in the proprietary portion of both income tax returns referring to them in Utah return as "Misc. (Interests)" and in the Federal return as "Miscellaneous (Interest)." In 1936 he showed the partners or members as
being George A. Sims, M. K. Sims and, on the Federal
return ''Interest credited to miscellaneous members" and
on the State return "Miscellaneous (Interest on Investment)." In 1937 and 1938 George A. and Milton K. Sims
showed themselves as the only persons listed as owners
(partners) in the appropriate place in the schedules. In
1939 on the Federal return in Schedule "J" "Partners
Share of Income and Credits" George and Milton listed
all of the plaintiff brothers and sisters as well as themselves as being owners and showed the amount of ordinary net income and the distribution of charitable contributions among the owners. In 1940 George and Milton
showed in Schedule "J" that they and the seven brothers
and sisters were the partners. Losses on the sale of stock
WeTe distributed to the owners, including the six plaintiffs herein, pro rata and charitable deductions were
distributed to the owners pro rata, each according to the
amount of his interest. Each year thereafter until the
commencement of this suit, all of the plaintiffs were
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shown as partners on the income tax returns and were
treated as owners for the purpose of distributing dividends and any other items which, under the tax law,
have a separate tax effect on owners and are accounted
separately from partnership net profit.
The last income tax return filed by defendants prior to
this litigation was prepared by defendants' accountants
on March 23, 1960 and is for the year 1959. Each of the
plaintiffs is listed on the returns for that year as a partner.
On June 3, 1960 this suit was filed and thereafter defendants ceased to list plaintiffs on the tax returns as
partners.
It is to be noted that each of these returns, beginning
with the 1932 return which was prepared in 1933 after the
death of the father of the parties, was wholly prepared by
the defendants, without any consultation with plaintiffs.
The record is clear that none of the plaintiffs interfered
with the management of the company by defendants after
agreeing on April 6, 1932 that they would not do so.

Each year from 1932 to 1960 the plaintiffs were advised
by defendants what the profit or loss had been, and in the
years 1939 and 1940 defendants sent plaintiffs copies of
the profit and loss statement and operating statement, in
each instance showing them as partners. Some of the
letters showing the distribution of profit have been lost,
but the copies of the 1939 and 1940 profit and loss statements and of the letters showing partnership profit distribution from 1942 through 1958 are in evidence aggregately marked Ex. P-E. In the years 1946, 1950, and 1951
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the document was entitled "Distributions of Partnership
Profits for Year" and in the other years the reference was
to 11 Salt Lake Transfer Company Profits."
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According to the income tax returns (Ex. P-J and P-K)
Robert B. Sims and Elmer L. Sims, sons of Milton K.
Sims, were shown as partners for the first time in 1942
and their names were placed on the bottom of the list of
partners after the plaintiffs' names. This same order of
listing continued through 1945. In 1946 G. Grant Sims
was added at the end of the list of partners on the returns
and on the list of owners and distribution of income sent
out to each of the plaintiffs (Ex. P-E, pages 12 and 13). In
1947 Elmer L. Sims and G. Grant Sims moved themselves
up the list of partners and were listed next after Milton K.
Sims and George A. Sims, with the plaintiffs listed after
them and the partner R. B. Sims listed last. This method
of listing continued except that in 1948 the partner R. B.
Sims was changed to Mrs. R. B. Sims (later called Mrs.
T. H. Mazuran), she being substituted in his place because
of his death. Mrs. Sims (Mazuran) is described by the
defendant, Elmer Sims, as owning and exercising all of
the incidents of partnership except that she doesn't participate in management (R. 299).
At the time of the death of George H. Sims (the father)
the partnership owned Kennecott Copper Company, Anaconda Copper Company, Utah Power and Light and
Z.C.M.I. stock. The dividends from this stock were regularly shown in the partnership income tax return (Ex.
P-J and P-K). In 1940 the Anaconda and Kennecott
stocks, which had been purchased in 1929 (Ex. D~F) and
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had a high basis were sold at a loss and the loss was distributed to the partners (Ex. P-E and page 3 of the 1940
Federal income tax return in Ex. P-J). In June, 1946 the
Utah Power and Light Company stock of the Salt Lake
Transfer Company was distributed to the owners of that
company. Each of the plaintiffs received 23 shares and
the capital account of each plaintiff was charged with the
cost of that stock on the books of the company, to-wit,
$275.31 (Ex. P-E, page 20).
On March 29, 1952 Elmer L. Sims wrote to each of the
plaintiffs and a copy of the letter is in evidence (Ex. P-E,
Page 20). In that letter he advised Mr. Malquist (the
husband of the plaintiff, Grace Malquist, and the one who
kept track of her interest in the Salt Lake Transfer
Company for her) that an adjustment had been made on
the depreciation schedule in the course of an audit. In
that letter he made the following statement: "According
to their audit the amounts of $773.09 for 1949 and
$2,278.27 for 1950 is correct, and these adjustments had
been issued to all the partners." In the ensuing years the
amount of the adjustment as it relates to each of the
plaintiffs is shown in the report of profits made to them
(Ex. P-E, Pages 21 et seq.).
Each of the plaintiffs testified that he or she understood
that his position with regard to the Salt Lake Transfer
Company was that of part owner and a partner after
April 6, 1932, but that he had agreed not to interfere with
George and Milt's management of the jointly owned
family business. The testimony of the plaintiff, Winifred
McDonald, in that respect is typical (R. 145) :
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"Q (By Mr. Tanner) I asked you, Mrs. McDonald1'11 repeat the question. Did you have an understanding on April 6, 1932 and subsequent thereto as to
whether or not you were a partner in the Salt Lake
Transfer Company? Now, you may answer that yes
or no.
A Yes. I was part owner and a partner as near as
I know without any interference.
Q Is that your understanding?
A Absolutely."

There was no contrary testimony by any party to the
April 6, 1932 agreement.
Plaintiff, Mrs. McDonald, testified that in 1954, defendant, George Sims, then managing head of the Salt
Lake Transfer Company, had a conference with her and
Claron Spencer at the Zions First National Bank in which
George Sims stated that Mrs. McDonald then owned a
share of the Salt Lake Transfer Company, which share he
estimated to be then worth $18,000.00 (R. 147 to 150).
This was not denied by George Sims.

1~

~t
!it
!r
~1 ;

~t·

Plaintiff, Louis Sims, testified that in 1956 defendant,
George Sims, offered to buy Louis Sims' interest in the
Salt Lake Transfer Company for $16,000.00, but that when
he (Louis) offered to buy George's share on the same
basis, George refused and no deal was made (R. 207-8).
He further testified that again, in 1959, George offered to
buy the interest of each family member for $18,000.00
apiece, but later withdrew the offer (R. 208-9). This was
never denied by George Sims. Grant Malquist, the husband of one of the plaintiffs, was present on the 1959
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occasion and states that, after a discussion of the necessity
for new arrangements among the brothers and sisters
because of the effect of Milt's death on their partnership,
George said that the boys (defendants Elmer and Grant)
were not content to go on with the arrangement that had
been in effect for many, many years (R. 185). He then describes what occurred as follows (R. 187):
"A He said he would offer each family member
who happened to be in the partnership an amount of
$18,000 in stock and that he would use the current
quoted price of the stock as shown in the newspaper
on that date and that was entirely satisfactory to the
members present. We inquired that that offer be also
made to the other partners and he indicated it would.
And with that he said, 'If you wish, I'll go down to
the bank and get the stocks right now.' So I offered to
drive him down and we drove to a bank, I don't' remember the name of it. It was on 2nd South between
Main and State. But it was late in the afternoon when
we arrived there. The bank was closed. George
came out and told me that and we drove back to the
house. And he said, 'We'll renew this tomorrow
morning.' Do you wish me to go on?
Q

Yes, continue to say what he said or did.

A The following morning he called me on the
telephone at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. David H.
Bullough and said, 'Grant, the deal is off.' He said, 'I
had a meeting last night with my sons and our attorney,' and he said, 'the deal is off.'
Q

So the transaction was not consummated?

A It was not consummated."
Defendant Elmer Sims testified that $27,000.00 of the
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accumulated profits belonging to plaintiffs were kept in
the Salt Lake Transfer Company as working capital
(R. 295).
Defendant, George Sims, testified regarding the ownership of the Salt Lake Transfer Company as follows (R.
316):
u:

"Q Actually the transfer company was considered
being owned one-third by you, one-third by Milt,
then one-third by all nine of you as brothers and
sisters?

A Yes."

ARGUMENT
GENERAL

All the issues of liability revolve around the answers to
these questions: Is Ex. P-B a valid agreement? If so, what
is its proper interpretation in light of its terms, the conditions as they existed, and the conduct of its parties at the
time of its execution and thereafter? Among other things,
the answer to these questions is dispositive of whether the
defendants' transfer to themselves of all of the realty of
the Salt Lake Transfer Company was wrongful, and
whether they must put it, or its equivalent in money, back
into the communal pot.

It is plaintiffs' contention that the relationship of trust
and confidence found to exist between the defendants
George and Milton Sims and the plaintiffs is significant in
two principal aspects, first, as it relates the state of the
burden of proof on the question of whether the 1932
agreement is void for fraud, and whether it was carried,
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and, second, if the agreement is not void, as it relates to
the question of how its terms should be interpreted, the
fiduciary having been the scrivener.
It is the plaintiffs' contention that the evidence of partnership recited in the Statement of Facts also has dual
significance, first, as it relates to the disputed finding
(against the plaintiffs) that no partnership existed between the parties after April 6, 1932, and, second, as it
relates to defendants' contention (the trial court found to
the contrary) that the only proper interpretation of the
1932 agreement is that plaintiffs ceased to be owners of
any portion of the Salt Lake Transfer Company in 1932,
having consummated a sale and transfer of their patrimony to George and Milton on the sad day of their
father's funeral.
Plaintiffs further contend that defendants are on the
horns of a dilemma. Either they must stand on the 1932
contract (Ex. P-B) and claim a 1932 sale at 1932 prices,
in which case the contract must be set aside for fraud,
mistake or undue influence, or they must admit parol
evidence to show that the contract actually was an option
or contract to sell in future, rather than a 1932 sale, in
which case the contract is valid, but the sales price is the
value at the time the option or call was exercised, which
is the 1960 price. In either event, defendants lose. This is
developed more extensively in Point I hereafter.
The argument in this brief will be directed first to the
points raised by plaintiffs in their cross-appeal and then
to the points of the defendants' appeal.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
EXHIBIT P-B WAS NOT VOID OR UNENFORCEABLE ON THE GROUNDS OF FRAUD, MISTAKE OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE.

,,:

li,;

r>

The trial court, both in the pretrial order (R. 89) and in
the conduct of the case, held plaintiffs to the burden of
proving fraud, mistake or undue influence by clear and
convincing evidence. This misconceives both the burden
of going forward and the quantum of proof in an action
where the defendant occupies a fiduciary relationship to
the plaintiffs.
The rule is that, where the relation between the parties
is one of trust and confidence, the courts of equity hold

that it raises a presumption of undue influence and throws
upon the dominant party the burden of establishing the
fairness of the transaction and that it was the free act of
the other party.
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts states the rule
as follows:
"Sec. 497. Definition and Effect of Undue Influence.
Where one party is under the domination of another, or by virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a
manner inconsistent with his welfare, a transaction
induced by unfair persuasion of the latter, is induced
by undue influence and voidable."

Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. Vol. 5, Sec. 1625 at
pages 4540 and 4541 says:
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"* * *Undue influence, 'is not necessarily a fraudulent
influence though it frequently is so .... It is a paramount influence, and when it is used for the benefit or
advantage of him who exercises it for such a selfish
purpose it may well be called 'fraudulent', and the
law so regards it; but there may be cases where it is
not actually fraudulent but in a moral sense innocent
though not harmless.' But 'as far as the execution of
instruments is concerned, the term fraud ordinarily
suggests the idea of deception; whereas undue influence suggests the idea of coerced volition.' " * * *

Thorne v. Reiser, 60 N.W. 2d 784, 245 Iowa 123, at page
788:
"The law concerning confidential relationships and
their effect upon the transactions between parties to
them is too well-settled to require much discussion.
Not the law but the facts trouble the courts in such
cases. * * * In the Sours case we pointed out that such
relationship is not restricted to any special or particular form. There may be no legal or family relationship between the parties. The relationship nevertheless exists 'when one has gained the confidence of
the other and purports to act or advise with the
other's interest in mind.' Restatement of the Law of
Trusts, section 2 (b); 37 C.J.S., Fraud (and other
authorities).
" * * * This does not mean there was anything wrong
or fraudulent in the relationship itself or that there
was any misrepresentation or undue influence exercised by defendants. But the relationship, if shown to
exist, casts upon the dominant party, before he can
avail himself of any benefit growing out of the transaction between them, the burden of showing the contract 'was fairly procured without undue influence or
other circumstance tending to impeach its fairness',
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Curtis v. Armagast, 158 Iowa 507, 138 N.W. 873, the
burden of proving his compliance with equitable
requisites."
Sizemore v. Miller, 247 P. 2d 224; 196 Ore. 89:
"• • • In arriving at the above conclusion, the trial
court overlooked the principle of law, which is wellestablished in this jurisdiction, that where a confidential relationship exists between parties, when
taken in connection with other suspicious circumstances, an inference of undue influence may be justified so as to require the beneficiary to proceed with
the proof and present evidence sufficient to overcome
the adverse inferences, and that slight evidence is
sufficient to set aside an agreement between them on
the ground of undue influence. Ingraham v. Struve,
Or., 246 P. 2d 858; In re Southman's Estate, 178 Or.
462, 168 P. 2d 572." (accent added.)

Sparks v. Sparks, 225 P. 2d 238; 101 C.A. 2d 129:

" * * * What constitutes undue influence and what
constitutes sufficient proof thereof depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each particular case. It 'is
a species of constructive fraud which the courts will
not undertake to define by any fixed principles, lest
the very definition itself furnish a finger-board pointing out the path by which it may be evaded.' Longmire v. Kruger, 80 Cal. App. 230, 239, 251 P. 692, 696.
There are certain relations from the existence of
which the law will infer special confidence, not only
those of husband and wife, parent and child, counsel
and client, etc., but in numerous cases where the facts
proved will warrant the inference. Bradley Co. v.
Bradley, 37 Cal. App. 263, 267, 173 P. 1011. A confidential relation in fact should be the test. Where a
grantor has trust and confidence in the integrity and
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fidelity of the grantee and the latter takes advantage
of the grantor relief will be afforded. Steinberger v.
Steinberger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116, 122, 140 P. 2d 31.
One who holds a confidential relationship will be
presumed to have taken undue advantage of his
trusting friend unless it shall appear that the latter
had independent advice and acted not only of his own
volition but with full comprehension of the results of
his action. Cox v. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 379, 156 P.
509.
"Persons standing in a confidential relation toward
others will not be permitted to retain benefits which
the others have conferred upon them unless they can
show to the satisfaction of the court that the person
by whom the benefits have been conferred were independently advised with reference to the transaction. Burrows v. Burrows, 126 Cal. App. 323, 329, 28
P. 2d 1072. No one who holds a confidential relation
toward another will be permitted to take advantage
of that relation in favor of himself or deal with the
other terms of his own making. In every such transaction the law will presume that the person who held
an influence over the other exercised it unduly to his
own advantage. Khoury v. Barham, 85 Cal. App. 2d
202, 212, 192 P. 2d 823. (accent added.)

Perry v. McConkie, 1 Ut. 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852, at page
854.

"* * *Our conclusions are further justified when it is
noted that, although fraud must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, we have adopted an exception to the principle in the case where, because of the
kinship of the parties, a fiduciary relationship exists,
as it does here, - requiring in such cases that the
fiduciary assume the burden of proving that his dealings with such beneficiary were fair and in good
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faith. • • • "
The facts to which the foregoing law must be applied
are these. The trial court found (R. 110) as follows:
"3. On April 6, 1932 at the time of the preparation
and execution of said agreement, the said George A.
Sims and Milton K. Sims occupied a position of trust
and confidence with relation to plaintiffs."
This finding is amply sustained by the evidence set forth
in this brief in the Statement of Facts on pages 5 to 7. All
of the parties to the 1932 agreement who testified, including the defendant, George A. Sims, agreed that defendants looked up to him as their elder brother, relied on
him and loved him. Each of the plaintiffs testified that
they relied on George's good faith, love and affection and
trusted him when he said that the contract (Ex. P-B)
was just so he and Milton could take care of the business
for them all, the family, without having to worry about
the others interfering with the management. George did
not deny that he so represented, but, instead, affirmed
that the others relied upon him (Statements of Facts,
supra, pages 6 and 7).
If this court were to hold that, by a strict fqur-corners
construction of the April 6, 1932 agreement, George had,
by using the trust and confidence of his unsuspecting
brothers and sisters, succeeded in slipping their share of
the business out from under them at depression prices,
with no obligation to pay for it until some unascertained
day in the future, with the sole and exclusive right to
allocate earnings between capital investment and profits
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(Ex. P-B, Par. 5) and with no obligation to pay for the
use of their property unless he could make a profit with
it, the court would be giving its blessings to an unconscionable result.

Sparks v. Sparks, supra, states that one who holds a
confidential relationship will be presumed to have taken
unfair advantage of his trusting friend (here they were
brothers and sisters) unless it shall appear ( 1) that the
latter had independent advice, (2) acted of his own volition, and ( 3) had a full comprehension of the results of
his action. Thorne v. Reiser, supra, says he can only avail
himself of benefit from the questioned transaction if he
shows the contract to have been procured without undue
influence or other circumstance tending to impeach its
fairness, and Perry v. McConkie, supra (Utah case), says
the fiduciary has the burden of proving that his dealings
with the beneficiary were (1) fair and (2) in good faith.
There was no word uttered, even by George himself, on
the matter of the state of his and Milt's mind in 1932, that
is, on their good faith. The timing of the contract to coincide with the period of maximum grief and distraction,
the deliberate exclusion of spouses, and the demanding
insistence that the contract be signed then and there
militates against good faith. These facts, combined with
the shifted burden of proof and the silence of the defendants require a determination that no good faith was
shown.
The Sparks v. Sparks standard gains defendants nothing. Defendants ( 1) deliberately excluded plaintiffs from
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independent advice, (2) deprived them of the exercise of
their own volition by timing and by insistence on immediate signing, and ( 3) by the statements that the business
was to be "continued for us," and the subsequent conduct
consonant with partnership and co-ownership, kept the
beneficiaries from comprehending that anyone claimed
they (plaintiffs) had already sold their inheritance.
Did defendants sustain the other half of their burden
under the Perry v. McConkie doctrine? Did they show the
contract to be fair? All evidence on this point outside the
two documents themselves (Ex. P-A and Ex. P-B) was
objected to by defendants and admitted only over their
objections. This evidence shows plaintiffs to have received
substantial profits, to have been treated as co-owners, to
have shared in the increased values of the Utah Power
and Light stock held by the partnership, to have been
charged with a share of the loss on the decreased value of
the copper company stocks, and to be now offered
$3,614.41 each for their share, plus some undistributed
profits. If the plaintiffs were not deprived of their inheritance in 1932, they would have received the same amount
of profits and the stock, and $27,358.88 each for their
share (R. 370-A, Finding 3). In other words, the transaction under examination is unfair in result if it did what
defendants claim, and the only way it might be fair is if it
is what plaintiffs claim it to be, a contract to sell upon
demand at the price to be fixed when the demand is exercised, that is, a contract to sell in 1960 at 1960 prices.
Thus plaintiffs conclude that, under the evidence, either
the contract is void because defendants failed to sustain
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their burden of proving good faith, or, if defendants did
prove good faith, the defendants have achieved a position
astride the dilemma referred to.
If the 1932 contract was not a contract of present sale at
1932 prices but was, instead, a contract to sell at such
future time as either party demanded, with all parties
entitled to the full growth of their share and the increase
in value of the assets it represented then it may be a fair
contract.
If, however, the contract was a 1932 sale, at 1932 prices,
with the brothers and sisters to take the risk of leaving
their money in the company, not even getting interest
unless there was profit, sharing fully in the cost of purchasing or developing land, trucks, other franchises and
other assets, but not sharing in those assets thus acquired
at plaintiffs' expense when they mature, develop or increase in value, then the contract was unfair, overreaching, and fraudulent.
Hence, if this court holds that no parol evidence or
evidence of conduct can be used to explain, alter or modify the 1932 agreement, it necessarily follows that the
court must then find that agreement to be void and unenforceable. The facts requiring this result are as follows:
(a) Plaintiffs pleaded fraud, mistake or undue influence in their Statement of Contentions served prior to the
December 12, 1961 pretrial conference (R. 85). This
pleading was incorporated in the Pretrial Order of December 13, 1961 (R. 88-90). The plaintiffs objected in
writing to the nature and extent of the burden the Pre-
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trial Order placed on them as to the fraud issue, stating
that plaintiffs claimed a fiduciary relationship, with its
resultant effect on the burden of proof (R. 91-2). The
objection was served on defendants December 20, 1961.
Two months later, February 19, 1962, this issue went to
trial, with the claim of fraud, mistake or undue influence,
and the claim of fiduciary relationship, clearly and timely
pleaded.
(b) At the trial, plaintiffs proved that the fiduciary relationship existed.
(c) Defendants adduced no evidence of any kind showing that the contract was fair, just or equitable, other than
the contract itself and proof of distribution of some of the
profits over the years and reinvestment of some of the
profits as working capital.
(d) Unless the contract is fair, just and equitable on
its face, defendants have failed to carry the fiduciary's
burden of going forward with the proof and proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the contract is fair,
just and equitable to the beneficiaries of the trust.
(e) The defendants having thus failed, the contract
must be held void because of the presumption against the
fiduciary in his dealings with those as to whom he occupies a fiduciary relationship.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS AND CERTAIN OF THE INDIVIDUAL
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DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PARTNERS.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER AN ACCOUNTING AND WINDING UP OF SAID
PARTNERSHIP.
Should the court have found that a partnership existed
among the parties?
If the 1932 agreement is held to be void, we must then

look to the conduct of the parties to determine their relationship. The pertinent conduct is as follows:
(a) They were co-owners of the business.
(b) They shared the profits in an agreed proportion.
(c) They shared the losses when any occurred.
(d) The plaintiffs had exercised their right to participate in the management by agreeing that George and
Milton have sole management on their behalf.
(e) Except for two years, the plaintiffs were, either
individually or collectively, shown as partners on all Federal and State income tax returns filed by defendants
between 1932 and 1960.
(f) All shared in credit for charitable contributions
made by Salt Lake Transfer Company as shown in the
partnership returns, which credits are deductible only by
co-owners.
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, codifying
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sections 6 and 7 of the Uniform Partnership Act, relating
to this point are:
"48-1-3. 'Partnership' defined. -A partnership is an
association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit. * * * "
"48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership.- In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, persons
who are not partners as to each other are not partners
as to third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by
entireties, joint property, common property, or part
ownership, does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether such co-owners do or do not share any
profits made by the use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons
sharing them have a joint or common right or interest
in any property from which the returns are derived.
( 4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits
of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a
partner in the business, but no such inference shall be
drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
{c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of
a deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of
payment vary with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good
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will of a business or other property by installments or otherwise."

Rowley on Partnership, 2nd Edition, Vol. 1, at pages
103 and 104:
"The requisites and essential elements of a partnership are implicit in the definition. In an opinion of
great force and clarity, Andrews, J. stated 'Partnership results from contract, express or implied. If
denied, it may be proved by the production of some
written instrument, by testimony as to some conversation, by circumstantial evidence. If nothing else
appears, the receipt by the defendant of a share of the
profits of the business is enough. * * * Assuming some
written contract between the parties, the question
may arise whether it creates a partnership. If it be
complete, if it expresses in good faith the full understanding and obligation of the parties, then it is for
the court to see whether a partnership exists. It may,
however, be a mere sham intended to hide the real
relationship. Then other results follow. In passing
upon it, effect is to be given to each provision. Mere
words will not blind us to realities. Statements that
no partnership is intended are not conclusive. If on
the whole, a contract contemplates an association of
two or more persons to carry on, as co-owners a business for profit, a partnership there is. * * * On the
other hand, if it be less than this, no partnership
exists.' "
At pages 164 to 166:
"Up until the year 1860 there was one test almost
universally applied by which to determine the existence of a partnership. That test was: if the parties
share in the profits of a business or transaction they
are partners, at least as to third persons. It is now
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recognized that although one shares in the profits of a
business he is not necessarily a partner for that reason alone. A general realization of the many exceptions which exist to the profit sharing test and its
consequent untrustworthiness led to its modification.
In its modified form the rule was often stated thus:
'Two or more persons who contract together to carry
on a business and share in the profits as common
owners thereof are partners.' In other words, in order
to constitute one a partner his right to share in the
profits must result from the fact that he is a part
owner of them. If the per cent of the profits due him
is a mere personal obligation owed him by his associate such person is not a partner. Regardless of the
fact as to whether profit sharing, intention or other
matters, are regarded as tests in any particular jurisdiction, all, perhaps, hold profit sharing to be an essential element of partnership.* * *" (emphasis
added)
At page 170:

"* * *'The salient features of an ordinary partnership are ( 1) a community of interest in profits and
losses, (2) a community of interest in the capital employed and (3) a community of power in administration. These are the primary tests and constitute the
indicia of the existence of a partnership.' "
At page 173:

"E. CONTROL.
The use of the test of control to determine the existence of a partnership is of recent origin, but has
been of increasing use. As stated by the draftsmen of
the Uniform Partnership Act 'To state that partners
are co-owners of a business is to state that they each
have the power of ultimate control.' The idea of con-
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trol as a test of partnership has been denominated as
the 'principal trader test' and thus expressed by one
writer: 'The ultimate inquiry in all cases is whether
the party claimed to be a partner has become by
agreement a principal trader in the business with
another. In other words, has he a right to participate
as principal trader in the management of the business? If he has, he is a partner. If he has not, he is not
a partner, with a single exception, which, however, is
rather apparent than real. The exception is this: A
person may be a partner, even though he has by express agreement entrusted the control of the business
exclusively to his associates in the business. The
question, strictly speaking, is not whether the party
has a right to control the business as principal trader
in the particular case, but whether he would have
such right in that case by virtue of the agreement between himself and another, in the absence of any express provision conferring that right upon his associate in the business. If it appears that he would have
had such right had it not been for his agreement to
the contrary, then he is a partner, and his agreement
merely operates as a surrender to his associate of a
right which he would otherwise have enjoyed. * * * "
(Emphasis added.)
At pages 176 to 177:
"F. SHARING OF LOSSES.

* * * Where other essential elements of the partnership relation - such as the sharing of profits, coownership of the business and the right of controlare present, the duty to share losses is ordinarily implied unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
The parties need not agree to share losses, and it is
usually sufficient that they enter into a relation with
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an idea of profit under an agreement that there is to
be a community of interest in the profits as such. An
agreement providing merely for a division of profits
and not of losses may be a partnership agreement.
And where one party furnishes the capital and the
other party the services in a business, and they agree
to share the profits, but without any reference to
losses, it may constitute a partnership. It has been
held that a sharing of losses is not essential to a partnership. An agreement to share profits usually implies an agreement to bear losses in the absence of a
stipulation to the contrary, although the absence of
an agreement to share losses is sometimes considered
a circumstance against the existence of a partnership. * * *"
At page 141:
"The Uniform Partnership Act provides that no
prima facie inference of partnership shall be drawn if
a share of the profits of a business was received as a
debt by installments or otherwise.
"Clauses (a) and (d) of subsection 7 ( 4) of the
Uniform Partnership Act are similar in that they deal
with a relation that may be either a debtor-creditor
relation or one of partnership. However, (a) appears
to relate to debts owing creditors where claims arose
in the course of trade and who made arrangements
with the financially embarrassed debtor to permit
continuance of the business in an effort to secure payment; or, as stated in one case to ' * * *increase the
amount recoverable on their claims'; while (d) appears to relate to loans made a partnership which
might result more favorably than if intell"est were
charged and which carry an element of risk. Historically this may have occurred as a device to escape the
consequences of usury. The distinction is more clearly
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brought out in the equivalent provisions of the English statute. Then too, these situations may exist in
combination, the creditor first postponing his debt for
a share of the profits and later making a loan or advance to the debtor."
At page 142:
"The sharing of profits is probably the only socalled essential element of the partnership relation
that is absolutely indispensable."
At page 147:
"As a general rule it is held that a partnership exists where persons share in the profits of an enterprise as profits and not as a measure of compensation
for services, property or opportunity in aid of the
business; or, otherwise stated, when they may be said
to be the co-owners of the business. * * * "
At age 168:

"* * *It is not what the parties call their relation
that determines but what they actually agree upon in
their contract. It is the intent to do those things which
constitute a partnership that should usually determine whether or not that relation exists between the
parties."
Point III could have merit only if the court should have
found that a partnership existed. If the trial court's finding in this regard is reversed and partnership found, the
only remedy under law and the pleadings would be to
declare a dissolution as of the date of Milton's death in
1959 and order an accounting and winding up. In this case,
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ship realty should be set aside and the property and its
proceeds restored to the partnership.

POINT IV
ANY DOUBTS OR UNCERTAINTIES AS TO THE
MEANING OR EFFECT OF EXHIBIT P-B MUST BE
RESOLVED AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.
The court found (R. 110) that the 1932 agreement was
a document prepared by the attorney for the defendants,
George and Milton, on their behalf and that plaintiffs had
no part in the preparation or drafting of that agreement.
Defendants and their predecessors were, then, the persons
who prepared the contract under discussion. The court
further found that said George and Milt occupied a position of trust and confidence with relation to the plaintiffs,
as has been previously discussed. The defendants other
than George and the estate of Milton are assignees of a
portion of their interests and would stand in the same
shoes so far as this contract is concerned.
The trial court found that, under the facts and conditions as he understood and determined them, the 1932
agreement was a valid and binding contract, but that it
had a different meaning and effect than defendants contended for. He held that the contract, despite its recitals
and some of its wording, was not a contract under which
plaintiffs sold their inheritance to defendants in 1932, but
was, instead, a contract under which either plaintiffs or
defendants could require a sale to be made at any time
they chose, plaintiffs, individually or collectively, by demanding payment and defendants by proferring payment,
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with the price to be determined by the fair market value
of the interest at the time the demand for payment, or
profer of payment was made. Necessarily this implies
that, until the sale is thus effected, the parties continued
to be co-owners.
The rule of construction urged in this point appears to
be admitted by defendants, who cite Maw v. Noble, 354
P. 2d 121, 10 Ut. 2d 440, a case approving the rule.

Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 385 P. 2d 608, 14 Ut. 2d 414, a decision of this court
handed down Dec. 11, 1963, states:
" ( 1) Any doubts or uncertainties as to the meaning or effect of the policy must be construed so as to
resolve said doubts or uncertainties against the defendant who prepared the contract."
POINT V
WHEN THERE IS ANY AMBIGUITY OR UNCERTAINTY IN A CONTRACT, THE CONSTRUCTION
GIVEN BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES WILL BE
FAVORED.
The above rule is set forth in the following text and
adopted as the law of the state of Utah in the following
Utah cases:

Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 623
at page 789-790.
"Sec. 623. Secondary Rules:

An Interpretation
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Given by the Parties Themselves Will be Favored.
An important aid in the interpretation of contracts is
the practical construction placed on the agreement
by the parties themselves. The process of practical
interpretation and application is a further indication
by the parties of the meaning which they have placed
upon the terms of the contract they have made.
Courts give great weight to these expressions, be they
acts or declarations. * *"

Woodward v. Edmunds, 57 P. 848, 20 Utah 118.

" * * *. If, however, there should be any doubt as to
the interpretation which is thus placed upon the contract under consideration, such doubt would seem to
be removed by the acts and conduct of the parties
themselves in relation thereto. The evidence clearly
shows that from 1894, when the respondent first
leased the herd, the sheep were, about the time of the
expiration of each successive lease, counted out to the
appellant, marked with his permanent mark, and
then again delivered over to the lessee. They were
constantly treated by the parties as the lessor's property. Again they were so treated when, on August 25,
1897, while the last lease was yet in force, the respondent himself went to the appellant, and again
sought to lease the same sheep which he then had in
his possession, under the lease hereinbefore construed, and actually signed an agreement which was
then and there drawn up for another term, and contained practically the same terms and conditions as
the one which was about to expire although, owing to
some disagreement between the parties, the instrument was not executed by the appellant. Manifestly,
by their acts and conduct, the parties to the instrument construed it as one of bailment merely and
~here there is any ambiguity in a contract, the' prac~
ttcal construction which the parties to the imstrument
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have given it before any controversy arose between
them should be adopted by the court. This court so
held in Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 331, 40 Pac.
206." (Emphasis added.)
Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp. (Utah 1954), 266 P. 2d
494, 1 ut. 2d 3'20.

* * *. It is fundamental that if effect can be given to
both of two apparently conflicting provisions in a
reasonable reconciliation that interpretation will
control. Williston on Contracts, sec. 622."

1. "

* * *. Further, in the interpretation of contracts, the
interpretation given by the parties themselves as
shown by their acts will be adopted by the court. 3
Williston on Contracts, sec. 623." (Emphasis added.)

2. "

POINT VI
THE 1932 AGREEMENT (EX. P-B) IS UNCERTAIN
AND AMBIGUOUS, CONTAINS CONFLICTING PROVISIONS AND IS NOT COMPLETE WITHIN ITS
FOUR CORNERS.
Defendants rely on Ex. P-B as being so clear, certain,
understandable and unambiguous as not to permit recourse to evidence outside its four corners as an aid to its
construction. Plaintiffs submit that the contract is so uncertain, ambiguous and incomplete that it can only be
understood and interpreted by recourse to all the facts
and circumstances surrounding its execution, and the
conduct of the parties during the 28 years it was (according to the trial court's finding) in full force and effect
prior to this litigation.
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The lack of certainty is apparent when one seeks the
answer to the key questions significant to a contract of
sale, a contract to sell, or a partnership agreement with
buy-out provisions. Such questions are:
1. What is the purchase price?
2. When does title pass?
3. How are profits to be determined?
4. Does a share of profits include a share in unearned
increment in asset values if the asset is sold during the
period of profit splitting, and before payment of the purchase price? If the asset is held?
5. When must seller's share of the profits be paid him?
May buyer hold those profits and use them? If buyer does
hold part of seller's profits, must he pay seller interest for
their use?
Let us consult the disputed contract and see how certain it is in the above regards:
1. What is the purchase price? Is it established with

certainty? The contract says:
"3. The present Salt Lake Transfer Company
agrees, upon six months demand from the person so
selling, to pay for each one-ninth so purchased oneninth of the sum found as the value of the GEORGE
H. SIMS interest as per the Bill of Sale above mentioned."
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How many dollars is that? Parol evidence is necessary to
identify the Bill of Sale and show that it is the document
referred to in the contract. Ex. P-B is obviously incomplete in and of itself on the matter of price. Does the
purchase price become certain when Ex. P-A (the Bill of
Sale) is located, identified, and admitted in evidence and
considered in connection with Ex. P-B? It says:
"In case any Grantee wishes to withdraw his or her
interest in the partnership property, the value of the
same shall be appraised by GLADYS S. BULLOUGH
and GEORGE A. SIMS and the figure set by these
two shall be binding upon the withdrawing Grantee."
Does this add certainty? On its face it appears to defer
valuation until one of the children "wishes to withdraw
his or her interest," but doesn't say whether the wish
must be subjective or expressed. It seems clear from the
testimony that none of the plaintiffs ever wished to withdraw, or thought they had done so. Certainly they didn't
sign Ex. P-B because of any wish on their part. It was
forced on them by George who said it must be signed if
the business was to continue. The first time they even
expressed a willingness to withdraw was in 1959 when
some of them said they'd take $18,000 but George
wouldn't pay it.
May one "withdraw" without wishing to, by signing
Ex. P-B? Does one "withdraw" before or after he ceases
to share in the profits? The agreement, even aided by the
Bill of Sale, furnishes no certain answer to these questions.
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The contract, even aided by Ex. P-A, fails to tell us the
time as of which the valuation is to be made. As of the
time of the wish? As of the time of the withdrawal? Or, as
of the time of the payment? How can a price be certain
which is to be the result of a valuation to be made as of a
date which is not clearly specified? The price cannot be
determined from the 1932 agreement without outside
help.
Even if the time when the valuation was to be made
were certain, the contract is uncertain and ambiguous as
to the standard of evaluation. Is it to be the fair market
value or the book value? Is it to be valued as a going
business? Is the value to be a cash sales price or a time
price? Or is the choice of the standard of evaluation to be
at the free, unfettered, final and binding option of the two
valuers? The document itself simply doesn't tell us. Either
the answer must be presumed or postulated, or the court
must consult extrinsic evidence as an aid.
2. When does title pass? Paragraph 2 of the contract
says "vendee, hereby purchases, and each of the vendors
hereby sells and conveys all the latter's interest." Paragraph 6 says "Each of the vendors covenant that no sale or
transfer of the interest in the old partnership has been
made by such vendor."
Paragraph 6 clearly does not say "that no sale or transfer of an interest in the old partnership has heretofore
been made." The contract must be strongly construed
against the scrivener and the inference drawn which is
less favorable to defendants.
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Referring again to the language of Ex. P-A, one could
hardly suppose that a withdrawal has been made if no
sale has been made. A contract to sell in the future could
be held to be an agreement to withdraw in the future, and
the trial court so held. It would be difficult to conclude
that the trial court clearly erred in so doing.
3. How are profits to be determined? Paragraph 5 of the
contract includes the provision that "the partners of the
present partnership shall be the sole judge of what is a
capital investment." Are they also to be the sole judge of
whether profits are to be determined by usual accounting
methods, and whether the accounting standards of the
Public Service Commission and Interstate Commerce
Commission are "usual"? Reference to extrinsic rules of
construction would seem to be required.
Under the 1932 agreement, when a "capital investment"
purchased out of what might otherwise have been
"profits" is sold, do vendors share in the proceeds of the
sale to the extent of the gain? Or only to the extent
profits were diverted from vendors to purchase the capital
asset? Or neither? The answer to this question determines
plaintiffs' participation, or lack of it, in a fleet of rolling
stock valued by the trial court (R. 369) at $175,000.00.
The question is very material. Can the contract be said to
be so complete and free from certainty in this regard as to
require extrinsic evidence to be excluded and the trial
court reversed?
Each of the other questions runs into a similar vacuum
when one seeks to pin the answer down with clarity and
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certainty. It cannot even be told from the contract when
plaintiffs are to receive their share of the profits. Is it to
be on demand, or at stated intervals? Perhaps they are to
be paid at "reasonable" intervals. If so, what is reasonable
must be determined by evidence outside the contract.
The trial court did not err in admitting extrinsic evidence to clarify the 1932 agreement. It had to look to the
conduct of the parties to supply enough answers to permit
the contract to be enforced at all. The alternative to admitting extrinsic evidence, both written and parol, would
have been to declare the contract so vague and incomplete
as to be unenforceable. Since it is the trial court's duty
under such circumstances to refer to extrinsic evidence
when it is available, it cannot be said that the trial court
erred by doing so.
POINT VII
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE PURPORTED VALUATION MADE IN 1947 WAS
NOT A VALUATION BINDING UNDER THE 1932
AGREEMENT.
Point VI of defendants' brief contends that the court
erred in "ignoring the valuation set in 1947 by those designated in the 1932 bill of sale and agreement." Defendants
assume the court ignored Ex. D-H, when in fact the court
considered it carefully and, in light of all the facts and
circumstances, found that it was not a valid and binding
valuation. Finding No. 7 (R. 111) reads as follows:
"There has never been a proper or binding valua-
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tion of plaintiffs' interests within the contemplation
of said agreement or within the contemplation of the
Bill of Sale (Exhibit "A" herein) by which plaintiffs
obtained their interest in the Salt Lake Transfer
Company."
Plaintiffs are entitled to have the evidence viewed most
favorably to them in determining if this finding is sustained. The pertinent facts are these:
It was not until June 30, 1960, that the time for valuing
plaintiffs' share of the partnership arrived. This is the
time that defendants exercised their right to buy plaintiffs' interest and offered payment of $8,579.40. Defendants could have exercised their right any time in the
preceding 28 years and thus fixed an earlier time of
valuation but chose not to do so. The bill of sale says:

"In case any Grantee wishes to withdraw his or her
interest in the partnership property, the value of the
same shall be appraised by GLADYS S. BULLOUGH
and GEORGE A. SIMS and the figure set by these
two shall be binding upon the withdrawing Grantee."
There was no contract provision for valuation prior to
withdrawal and particularly no authority for the valuation claimed in 1947. The 1932 contract was, and was
construed by the court to be, more a matter of fixing the
terms for continuing the joint business of the parties than
it was a withdrawal. There being no withdrawal until
defendants exercised their rights to expel plaintiffs, that
is, until 1960, no purported valuation at a different time
would qualify under the Bill of Sale. Since the parties
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hndn't made a 1960 valuation, the court proceeded to
do so.
Gladys S. Bullough never made a valuation at any time.
The evidence is that her husband discussed the books and
records with Grant Sims and his accountant, and that Ex.
D-H was drawn up under Grant's direction and in accord
with his partisan interpretation of the Bill of Sale and
1932 agreement. Either D-H or D-I, and defendants never
established which, was simply placed before Gladys at
her home at 7: 30 a.m. one morning by George, who
assured her when she demurred (R. 235-6) "It's perfectly
all right, Sis. We have just got to do it for the records."
Her testimony (R. 235) was that, although she did sign
Ex. D-H, she did not participate in deriving the figures in
the accounting, did not make an evaluation or have estimates made, and did not check on the fair value of real
estate or franchises. To hold that all six of the plaintiffs
were bound by such a travesty of a valuation would be a
gross injustice.
The man who did participate in the preparation of Ex's.
D-H and D-I, David H. Bullough, testified (R. 246) that
he prepared them on the assumption that he was to try to
find the April, 1932 worth of the Salt Lake Transfer Company and that that was what Ex's. D-H and D-I represented. The trial court held this to be a wrong legal theory
and hence an invalid premise.
The evidence amply sustains the trial court's conclusions that the purported valuation of 1947, being based on
an invalid premise and erroneous theory, having been
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made by the wrong person (David instead of Gladys),
having been made without estimates, valuations or accounting, and having been made before any of plaintiffs
withed to withdraw was not a proper or binding valuation
of plaintiffs' interest. No other result could have been
reached under the evidence.
POINT VIII
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT OF THE PARTIES TO
REACH A SETTLEMENT IN 1959 WAS NOT A BINDING VALUATION.
In Point VII, as in Point VI, defendants assume that the
trial court ignored evidence which it considered and
weighed with the other evidence. Nothing about the 1959
discussion between George and some unidentified persons,
who included the plaintiff, Louis Sims, and Grant Malquist, husband of one of the plaintiffs, recommends their
proposed price as a va1uation. None of plaintiffs saw the
books or had any idea of the state of the business. They
simply said they would take $18,000 for their shares and
not attempt any formal or complete valuation. George
refused to pay it. To hold that a plaintiff cannot recover
more than the lowest acceptable offer of compromise
would introduce a new and dangerous concept to our law.
The entire conversation is set forth at page 16 of this
brief. Its primary significance is that it constitutes a recognition by the principal defendant that the plaintiffs
were his co-owners and partners as late as 1959.
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POINT IX
ASSUMING A 1960 PURCHASE PRICE, THE COURT
DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
AS TO THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID PLAINTIFFS BY
DEFENDANTS.
Having concluded that the 1932 agreement was valid
and enforceable, the court was faced with the problem of
determining the price at which plaintiffs' interest in the
Salt Lake Transfer Company had been sold to defendants
at the June, 1960 date of sale. The trial court decided that
each plaintiff was entitled to receive from defendants all
undistributed portions of his share of the earnings, together with the value of his 6-2/3% share of the Salt Lake
Transfer Company, including the real property previously
diverted by defendants into Sims Realty, Inc., and its
rents and profits.
The trial court concluded, and adjudged, that the value
of the Salt Lake Transfer Company was an amount not
less than the fair market value of all of its parts. It concluded that this was a fair and proper way to evaluate the
proportional interests of the plaintiffs because it only required the defendants to pay the fair price of the things
the defendants received and it gave to the plaintiffs, as the
proceeds of their sale, the fair value of the things they
transferred over. Since the sale from plaintiffs to defendants had been accomplished without an intermediary real
estate agent or salesman, no part of the purchase price
had to be lost to either party as an expense of the sale
between them. This seems an eminently fair and proper
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way to approach the subject.
Plaintiffs employed a certified public accountant skilled
in transportation company accounting and had him determine from the books and records of the Salt Lake
Transfer Company what portion of the earnings plaintiffs
should have received in the years 1932 to June, 1960 and
deduct the amount actually paid. This result is set forth in
Ex. P-16 and there seems to be no substantial conflict
between the parties on this one point.
The accountant then proceeded to determine from the
books and records of the Salt Lake Transfer Company the
book value of the company exclusive of certain items
which could be expected to have a fair market value
different from their book value. The items thus separated
were the real estate (separately appraised as the value of
Sims Realty, Inc. because it had been set aside by defendants into Sims Realty), the rolling stock, certain investments having an undisputed value of $3,312.00 and the
intangibles, consisting of the franchises, certificates and
operating rights, all of which are regularly marketable.
This procedure is the usual procedure followed in ascertaining the true market value of any business that includes among its assets items whose actual fair market
value may be different, whether greater or smaller, than
the book value.
The accountant determined (Ex. P-16) that the book
value of the Salt Lake Transfer Company exclusive of the
real estate, rolling stock, investments and operating rights
was a negative $34,017.09. This was not the subject of any
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substantial dispute. The next problem was to determine
the fair market value of the separately valued assets of
the Salt Lake Transfer Company and witnesses were
called for that purpose.
Plaintiffs called the most eminent, experienced and
capable truck appraiser in these Western United States to
appraise the motorized equipment. Defendants called no
independent expert at all, relying upon the testimony of
the defendant, G. Grant Sims only. Plaintiffs called Ray
Paramore, a ten-year veteran of the new and used heavy
trailer sales business at Salt Lake City to appraise the
trailers. Defendants called no independent expert, relying
on the testimony of the defendant, Grant Sims, only.
To establish the value of the franchises, certificates and
operating rights, plaintiffs called two independent experts, Walt Utzinger, a man who had actually marketed a
number of authorities similar to those of the Salt Lake
Transfer Company, and Leonard D. Seifers, Vice-President and Assistant to the President of Interstate Motor
Lines, Inc., one of the most efficient, experienced and
capable operators in the motor truck industry, an expert
on the marketing of franchises, certificates and operating
rights. Both of these witnesses were wholly impartial,
having no interest whatever in the outcome of the litigation. The defendants relied solely on the testimony of the
defendants, Grant Sims and Elmer Sims.
Defendants called a young assistant professor from the
University of Utah named Frank K. Stuart who was
serving on the faculty at the University at the same time
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he was in the process of writing his thesis looking toward
obtaining his Ph.D. degree. Mr. Stuart testified that he
based his estimate of value solely upon the earnings of the
company. He stated, when asked whether he had made an
examination of the Salt Lake Transfer Company, that,
he "would not really call it an examination, it wasn't a
detailed examination" (R. 631). He further stated that he
had not verified such things as whether the company
operated on its own real property or that of others (R.
631), and that he didn't know whether the company had
any franchises or operating rights. In the latter regard his
testimony is as follows (R. 647):
"A (Mr. Stuart)*** I don't know what their rights
are- where they have to go. I don't even know
whether they have rights or not to deliver to Clearfield.

Q And even though you don't know whether they
have rights or not, and even though you don't know
whether they have land or not, you would still feel
that $135,000.00 is a fair valuation for this company,
is that right?
A As a going concern."
His testimony is fairly summed up by the following
question and answer (R. 635):
"Q (Mr. Tanner) ***For example, your evaluation of this company at $135,000.00 is made quite
irrespective of whether or not the company's assets
include $150,000.00, $200,000.00 or $50,000.00 cash in
addition to the real estate, is it not?
A The assets are only as valuable as what they
can produce."
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In summary, Mr. Stuart did not contest the valuation of
any of the assets evaluated by plaintiffs' independent
expert witnesses, contending only that, irrespective of the
fair market value of any of its component assets, no
company is worth any more than its average earnings
multiplied by a given multiple, and that $135,000.00 was
the figure he got when he picked certain years, averaged
the income and multiplied it out. The trial court concluded that this approach was not the proper approach
for determining the sales price between plaintiffs and
defendants and so adjudged in the first trial (R. 114-5).
The trial court found against Mr. Stuart's testimony, apparently concluding that it had no probative value in this
case, being unsound in both concept and execution.
Of overriding significance is the fact that defendants
failed to call a single independent expert witness as to the
value of the real estate, the rolling stock or the franchises.
From their failure to call a real estate appraiser to
challenge the appraisal of plaintiffs' experts, Edmund D.
Cook, M.A. I. and Augustus B. C. Johns, M.A.I., S.R.A., one
can only infer that the real estate appraisers known to
and presumably consulted by defendants and by defendants' capable and experienced counsel all came up with an
appraised value for the real estate which was equal to or
in excess of that claimed by plaintiffs' witnesses. Plaintiffs' appraisal (Ex. D-2) is full, detailed and complete. It
was in the hands of defendants and their counsel for the
whole of the six-day trial and could readily be read,
analyzed, and evaluated by any of the many other professional real estate appraisers of this cQmmunity. It would
be unreasonable to assume that defendants and their at-
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torneys were so negligent as to fail to consult a real estate
appraiser.
It is equally significant that defendants called no independent witnesses as to the fair market value of the
motorized rolling stock or the trailers, even though they
had available to them in this community all of the usual
purveyors of new and used equipment, and even though
defendants are, as to most such persons, old and valued
customers. It is reasonable to assume from this that the
independent appraisers arrived at values in excess of
those shown by plaintiffs' witnesses. It is not reasonable
to assume that defendants' capable and experienced attorneys were so slovenly in the discharge of their duties
that they failed to consult the purveyors of equipment so
readily available to them.
Again it is significant that defendants, whose counsel
appear before this court regularly as the representatives
of many outstanding transportation companies, failed to
call a single independent expert to challenge the appraisals of Mr. Utzinger and Mr. Seifers regarding the
value of the franchises, certificates and operating rights of
the Salt Lake Transfer Company. Defendants have been
engaged in the transportation industry for many decades.
If, as the court may assume, defendants and their counsel
consulted independent appraisers regarding the evaluation of the said franchises, certificates and operating
rights, it may be supposed that they would have called
some of their friends or acquaintances to challenge the
appraisal of plaintiffs' experts, were it not for the fact
that their consultations with other experts resulted in
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appraisals by those experts which were equal to or in
excess of those of plaintiffs' witnesses.
Plaintiffs' only quarrel with the findings of the trial
court as to the value of the separately valued assets of the
Salt Lake Transfer Company and of the real estate of the
parties is that, in each instance, the court determined the
value to be very substantially lower than the value set by
the independent expert appraisers. Despite this objection,
plaintiffs deem that they are bound by a determination of
fact made by the trier of the fact when there is any competent evidence in the record to sustain it. Plaintiffs
believe and urge that this same rule applies with equal
force to defendants. There is an abundance of evidence to
support the valuations made by the trial court, and there
is an abundance of evidence which would support a very
substantially higher valuation in regard to each disputed
item.

A comparison between the testimony of plaintiffs' expert witnesses as to value and the trial court's finding in
that regard is as follows:
1. Real Estate owned by Sims Realty:

Plaintiffs' witnesses (Ex. D-2)
Court's finding (R. 368)

$152,000
105,000

Difference

$ 47,000

2. Rolling stock:
Plaintiffs' witnesses (Exs. P-1 and P-4)
Court's finding (R. 369)

$254,450
175,000

Difference

$ 79,450
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3. Franchises, certificates and operating rights:
Plaintiffs' witnesses (not less than
$255,000 nor more than $365,000)
$255,000 - 365,000
Court's finding (R. 369)
150,000 - 150,000
Difference

$105,000 - 215,000

A more complete and detailed memorandum regarding
values and valuations is found in the record on appeal
(R. 331 to 344 incl.). The court's particular attention is
invited to said memorandum and to Ex. P-16. The fact
analyses and details included in said memorandum are
not reproduced in this brief in full because the briefs of
counsel herein are already very long and plaintiffs want
to avoid any unnecessary enlargement of them.
Defendants have devoted a very substantial portion of
the argument under Point VIII of their brief to the proposition that the better evidence as to value is that given by
their witnesses or that arrived at by counsel's own unsupported analysis of the appraisal report of plaintiffs'
real estate appraisers. Plaintiffs submit that defendants
are not entitled to a reversal of the trial court's findings of
fact simply because they prefer the valuation of their own
witnesses. They are entitled to reversal only when the
record is without credible evidence to support the trial
court's findings of fact. In this instance, the best evidence
sustains the trial court's findings and there is ample evidence which could (and in plaintiffs' opinion should)
sustain a far larger judgment than that rendered.
In their zeal, defendants have made statements in their
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brief which are grave distortions of the state of the
record. An example, by no means the only one, is the
following statement on page 70 of appellants' brief regarding John Sims' compromise with George Sims:
"••• This was an arms-length transaction arrived
at by a knowledgable and discriminating seller with
a knowledgable and discriminating buyer, where
neither was under any compulsion to complete the
transaction. John Sims was no neophyte in the business world. The evidence is that he was a successful
automobile dealer in San Bernardino, * * *."
The only evidence on this subject is the testimony of
Grant Sims (R. 760) and George Sims (R. 769) as follows:
"Q What business is he (John) in?

A (Grant Sims) He sells trucks and automobiles
in San Bernardino, California.
Q Do you mean just as a salesman?

A He is the owner of an agency, but he possibly
rtells.
Q An experienced businessman?

A Of many years.
Q Experienced in the buying and selling of motor

~ehicles?

A That is true."
·'THE WITNESS (George Sims) : John asked me if
I would buy his interest. I said: 'Well, John, how
much do you want for it?' And he said: 'I will take
ten thousand dollars.' He was talking about being
hard up and needed money, and I said: 'John, I will
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give you ten thousand dollars.' And I wrote out a
check***."
The disparity between the record and the brief is glaringly self evident.
Defendants urge that the trial court used a salvage
value basis in arriving at its findings and judgment and
that salvage value cannot be rightfully ascertained unless
you determine the liquidation or salvage expense. By
analogy to debating terms, defendants first set up a straw
man and then destroy it.
·
In the first place, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the court used a salvage value basis for its
evaluation and, in the second place, there is nothing about
the contract between the parties to indicate that they
intended any sales commissions or sales expenses to be
deducted from the purchase price, since no such expense
was to be incurred. It should be noted that if defendants
are actually concerned that they are overcharged in the
trial court's determination of value, they need only agree
to an accounting and winding up. In that event all costs of
sale and sales commissions would in fact be deducted
before the balance is distributed among the partners according to their ownership. Their unwillingness to do this
could evidence a belief that the damages here awarded
are: as plaintiffs have contended, very substantially less
than the actual worth of plaintiffs' interests in the company.
There would be no more justification for requiring the
amounts to be paid by defendants to plaintiffs for their
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interest in the Salt Lake Transfer Company to be reduced
by a theoretical cost of sale or sales commission than
there would be for inserting a sales commission in an
action between the vendor of real estate and vendee of
real estate where no sales agent was involved, and deducting this theoretical, unincurred cost from the sales
price set in the real estate contract. There was no commission incurred in the sale from plaintiffs to defendants, no
commission is anticipated in future, and the only evidence
is that defendants propose to continue to operate the
business they have thus purchased and not to incur a sales
commission.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's interpretation of the contract between
plaintiffs and defendants is amply justified by the terms
of that contract, the facts and circumstances surrounding
its execution and the conduct of the parties in the years
since it was made. Plaintiffs' only complaint is that the
trial court should have, under the evidence and the applicable rules of law, found the 1932 agreement to have
been void and further found the status of the parties in
relation to one another to have been that of partners, with
the partnership dissolved by the death of Milton K. Sims
in 1959. The amount of damages found by the trial court
are abundantly supported by the evidence, and the evidence would have supported damages in a far greater
sum.

Under these circumstances, plaintiffs respectfully urge
the court either to affirm the judgment of the trial court,
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or, if that judgment is to be varied on appeal, to hold that
the 1932 agreement between the parties is vod and unenforceable and that the relationship of the parties during
the intervening years has been that of partnership, and to
order an accounting by defendants of the partnership's
conduct and assets, including the real property diverted
to Sims Realty Company, and a winding up of the
business.
Respectfully submitted,
BEROL & GEERNAERT and
EARL D. TANNER
By

EARL

D.

TANNER

Attorneys for Plaintiffs- Respondents
and Cross Appellants
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